We live in an era of rising globalization and rising wage inequality. We propose a theory that suggests that these phenomena are related because trade liberalization raises the relative demand for skilled workers in all countries. In our model, only the lowest-cost …rms participate in the global economy exactly along the lines of (Melitz 2003) . In addition to di¤ering in their productivity, …rms in our model di¤er in their skill intensity. We model skill-biased technology as a correlation between skill intensity and technological acumen, and we estimate this correlation to be large using …rm-level data from Chile in 1996. Skill-biased technological heterogeneity implies that, on average, the most competitive …rms are also the most skillintensive. As a consequence, a fall in trade costs leads to both greater trade volumes and an increase in the relative demand for skill, as the lowest-cost/most-skilled …rms expand to serve the export market while less skill-intensive non-exporters retrench in the face of increased import competition. This mechanism works regardless of factor endowment di¤erences. Thus we provide an explanation for why globalization and wage inequality move together in both skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries.
INTRODUCTION
Two of the most striking trends in the global economy since 1970 are globalization and increasing wage inequality. For example, in the United States, the premium that college graduates earn over high school graduates grew by 20 percentage points between 1971 ((Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008 ). Over the same period, the ratio of trade to GDP in the U.S. grew 15 percentage points. Similar trends are apparent around the world, including in many developing countries ( (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007) ). This raises an important but di¢ cult question for applied economics: has increased globalization contributed to growing wage inequality? More precisely, have reductions in the costs of cross-border transactions led to both greater globalization and increased wage inequality?
There is a large, fascinating, and inconclusive literature on this question. The primary alternative hypothesis is technological: skill-biased technological change, especially when embodied in information and communications technology (ICT) investment, We thank John McLaren for helpful discussions. This version is highly preliminary, please do not cite, post online, or circulate without authors' permission.
In the Melitz model, there is one factor of production, and …rms are identical up to a Hicks neutral productivity parameter ' that shifts marginal cost. In an important paper, Bernard et al combine the Melitz model with the classic 2 2 2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, which yields rich interactions between …rm heterogeneity and factor proportions di¤erences across sectors and countries. Our model takes a di¤erent approach to combining …rm heterogeneity with factor proportions di¤erences: we assume that …rms di¤er continuously and randomly in two dimensions, productivity and skill intensity. We also depart from the assumption, common to the entire Heckscher-Ohlin tradition in trade theory, that the elasticity of substitution in demand is higher between varieties produced with a common factor intensity than it is between goods produced with di¤erent factor intensities.
In this section, we …rst develop the basic structure of our model, and then analyze equilibrium in two cases. The …rst case considers trade between two identical countries, and the second introduces di¤erences in aggregate factor endowment across countries.
Skill biased heterogeneous …rms
As in (Melitz 2003) , …rms in our model must incur a sunk cost before discovering their variable cost function. As in , production requires both skilled and unskilled labor, which are paid s and w respectively. We assume that variable cost functions di¤er randomly in two dimensions, skill intensity and productivity in marginal cost ', c v ( ; '; s; w; ) = s w 
Similarly, unskilled labor demand in variable cost per unit output is
Because ' is a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter, factor intensity in variable cost does not depend on productivity, 
The technology parameters and ' are drawn simultaneously from a joint distribution function G ( ; '). As will be seen below, …rms that have the same value of but di¤er in will be alike in almost every respect (revenue, pro…tability, export status, etc.) except for their factor demands. Thus, while in (Melitz 2003) and …rms are indexed only by their productivity ', in our model the relevant index will in most settings be inverse marginal cost . 2 There are three …xed cost activities in our model: entry, production for domestic sale, and exporting. While factor intensity in variable costs di¤er across …rms in our model, we assume that factor intensity in …xed costs are common across …rms. The …xed cost functions are c fe (s; w) = ! (s; w) f e (5) c f (s; w) = ! (s; w) f (6) c fx (s; w) = ! (s; w) f x
where f e , f , and f x denote …xed costs associated with entry, domestic production, and exporting respectively. The factor cost term ! (s; w) is the same for all …rms and …xed cost activities. Furthermore, we assume that the factor intensity of …xed costs is constant, and equal to the economy's overall factor abundance,
where H and L are the economy's inelastic aggregate supplies of skilled and unskilled workers respectively. We make these assumptions about the factor intensity of …xed costs for analytical convenience, and for comparability with the literature. Because we want to restrict the heterogeneity of …rms to di¤erences in their variable costs, we assume that and ' do not a¤ect productivity in …xed costs. As will be seen below, the …xed factor proportions assumption neutralizes the e¤ect of variations in entry on aggregate relative factor demands.
Demand
Consumer preferences are given by a standard symmetric CES utility function with elasticity of substitution > 1. The assumed market structure is monopolistic competition. As is well-known for this setup, …rms charge a price p which is a constant markup over marginal cost. Marginal cost is 1 for sales in the domestic market d and for sales in the export market x, where > 1 is the usual iceberg transport cost factor, so
where = 1 2 (0; 1). Our assumptions on demand imply that consumer preferences over goods have no connection to the factor intensity of goods'production. This is a natural speci…cation, since preferences and production techniques are logically separate concepts, and there is no particular empirical reason to think that they are linked. However, our assumption is in sharp contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition in trade theory. In the canonical 2 2 2 model, the two homogeneous goods di¤er in their factor intensity, there is a …nite elasticity of substitution between the goods, and an in…nite elasticity of substitution across "varieties" within goods. In their integration of monopolistic competition into the 2 2 2 model, (Helpman and Krugman 1985) maintain this ranking of elasticities of substitution in less extreme form: there is a …nite elasticity of substitution > 1 across varieties produced with a given factor intensity, and a smaller elasticity of substitution across varieties produced with di¤erent factor intensities. The same assumptions on preferences are made by and (Burstein and Vogel 2010) . Like our model, the model of (Romalis 2004) features monopolistic competition and Cobb-Douglas production where the factor cost shares vary continuously. Following (Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson 1980) , Romalis identi…es goods with their factor intensity, and assumes that the elasticity of substitution across goods is one while the elasticity across varieties within goods is greater than one. As will become clear in what follows, our decision to break with this Heckscher-Ohlin tradition and sever the link between preferences and production technology has major implications for how factor markets respond to trade liberalization.
Equilibrium with identical countries
In this section, we consider trade between two countries that are identical in every way, including their factor endowments H and L and the distribution G ( ; ') from which entering …rms draw their technology 3 . As in (Melitz 2003) , entering …rms must pay a …xed cost ! (s; w) f e to learn their technology, a …xed cost ! (s; w) f if they wish to sell in the domestic market, and a …xed cost ! (s; w) f x if they wish to export. Much of this section is based very closely on (Melitz 2003) , so we will move quickly.
Firm behavior
With monopolistic competition and CES preferences, …rm-level demand depends on aggregate nominal income R and the aggregate price index P: Since prices depend only on each …rm's inverse marginal cost ; revenue and sales will di¤er across two …rms if and only if they di¤er in . Standard computations show that the associated sales revenue r and pro…ts from domestic sales d and exporting x are
Note that we have de…ned x ( ) as the pro…t from exporting only. If a …rm sells in both export and domestic markets, then its aggregate pro…ts will be d ( ) + x ( ).
Firms will sell in a market only if pro…ts from doing so are non-negative. Thus, equations (14) and (15) implicitly de…ne the minimum levels of for which …rms will choose to sell at home and abroad,
Substituting using (12) and (13) and dividing (17) by (16) implies
As long as
This implies that all exporting …rms will also sell domestically and the highest cost surviving …rms will not export. We will maintain this realistic parameter restriction in all of what follows. The cuto¤s and x de…ne regions in ( ; ') space,
All …rms with ( ; ') 2 D are active in equilibrium while …rms with ( ; ') 2 X are also exporters, where X D: These regions are illustrated in Figure 1 . After paying the entry …xed cost and before discovering its'technology, the ex ante probability that a potential …rm is active and/or an exporter is the probability that it draws a technology ( ; ') in D or X respectively,
where g ( ; ') = @ 2 G @ @' is the joint density associated with G ( ; ') : Conditional on selling domestically, the probability of being an exporter is = 
Entry
There is an unbounded number of risk-neutral potential entrants. Free entry implies that in equilibrium the expected value of entry is equal to the …xed entry cost entry. To develop this free entry condition, we follow , who simplify the treatment of free entry in (Melitz 2003) .
The weighted average productivity of all active …rms and exporters respectively arẽ
The average …rm will make variable pro…ts d ~ ; while the average exporter will make additional variable pro…ts x ~ x : Thus the expected pro…t conditional on entry is
The average entrant will earn until death, which arrives at rate : With no discounting, the expected value of entry is then d , so the free entry condition is
Using the cuto¤ conditions (16) and (17) together with the fact that
and the de…nitions of pro…t, the free entry condition (26) can be rewritten as
Although the factor cost terms ! (s; w) associated with the …xed costs do not appear in (27), factor prices do enter the equation because they help determine the boundaries of the sets D and X. Thus, unlike , it is necessary to solve for factor prices jointly with the cuto¤ .
Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium conditions in our model are quite di¤erent from the corresponding conditions in (Melitz 2003) and . The reason is that in our model, each …rms' absolute and relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor depends on its technology draw ( ; ') as well as factor prices. In particular, two …rms that have the same level of ; and thus the same prices, revenues, etc. may have quite di¤erent demands for labor.
From the expressions for inverse marginal cost, prices and revenue (equations 4, 10, 11, 12, and 13), we obtain total output for domestic sale and for export,
Using (2) and (3) with (28) and (29), we can express each …rm's demand for skilled and unskilled labor in variable cost. Labor demand per …rm for domestic sales is,
H dv ( ; '; s; w) = RP 1 s
1 w
(1 )(1
We have written labor demand per …rm as the product of two terms, one which depends on the aggregates RP 1 and one which depends on the …rms technology ( ; '). Labor demand per …rm for export sales is, 8 ( ; ') 2 X; a fraction 1 of domestic sales,
Total labor demand for exporters is the sum of labor used for domestic and export sales.
The mass of …rms in the economy in equilibrium is M , and the mass of exporters is M x = M: To compute aggregate labor demand in variable cost we integrate over the per-…rm labor demands for all active …rms, and multiply by the mass of …rms. This gives aggregate labor demand
Dividing (34) by (35) gives aggregate relative skill demand in variable cost,
Next we develop aggregate labor demand in …xed cost activities. Let the number of prospective new …rms at each moment be M e ; of whom a fraction d will produce after discovering their technology. In steady state equilibrium, the number of new …rms per unit time equals the number of dying …rms, d M e = M . Thus for each active …rm, there are d entrants, of whom a fraction x are also exporters. Using (5), (6), and (7) gives total …xed costs per active …rm 4 ,
By Shepard's lemma, skilled and unskilled labor demand in …xed cost activities are
Dividing (38) by (39) gives aggregate relative skill demand in …xed cost activities as
By our parameterization of in (9), it immediately follows that
Thus variations in the level of …xed cost activities do not a¤ect the aggregate relative skill supply available for variable cost production. This allows us to state the relative labor market clearing condition using (36) as
At this point we choose the unskilled age w as our numeraire, w = 1; so s is the skill premium. The relative labor market clearing condition (41) and the the free entry condition (27) constitute a two equation system in two key endogenous variables, s and : As will be seen in the next section, all the rest of the endogenous variables in the model are functions of and s; so equations (27) and (41) are the key equations for solving the symmetric country version of our model.
Aggregation and equilibrium
To close the model we need to determine the aggregates M, R and P. Although w is our numeraire, we continue to write it out explicitly in what follows for clarity and to prepare for the analysis of the model with factor endowment di¤erences in the next section.
As in (Melitz 2003) , the free entry condition implies that pro…ts equal the expenditure on …xed costs, which in turn is paid to labor. Thus all revenue goes to labor, so
Revenue of the average …rm is related to the pro…t of the average …rm by = r ! (s; w) (f + x f ) : Substituting from the free entry condition (26) gives
This allows us to determine the mass of …rms,
The price index comes from the CES utility function, and depends on the prices of domestically produced and imported goods. Using the pricing equations (21) and (22) in the standard formula for the CES price index gives
This completes the description of the model in the case of identical countries. Equations (27) and (41) solve for and s. Equation (18) then determines x ; which allows computation of~ d and~ x using (23) and (24). The aggregates R, M, and P can then be computed using equations (42), (44), and (45). All …rm level variables are functions of s, M, R, and P.
Trade liberalization and the skill premium
In our model, as in (Melitz 2003) , exporters are low cost …rms. In the data, a common …nding is that exporters are more skill intensive than non-exporting …rms, even within industries. We will present data below that illustrates the skill bias of exporters for Chile, and the same is true for the United States (see for example Table  3 in (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott 2007) ).
If the skill premium is positive s w > 1 ; then skill intensive …rms will have higher costs, controlling for productivity '. Therefore, in our model the only way for exporters to be more skill-intensive than the average is if skill intensity and productivity ' are positively correlated when …rms draw their technology parameters. In such a case, high skill intensity is on average associated with high inverse marginal cost . For now we simply assume such a correlation in the ex ante technology distribution G ( ; '), and we will calibrate the correlation in the numerical analysis below. What does our model imply about the labor market e¤ects of trade liberalization? To be concrete, we consider a fall in the variable trade cost parameter : Holding factor prices …xed for the moment, our model works exactly like (Melitz 2003) : a fall in both intensi…es import competition and makes exporting more attractive at the margin. In the new equilibrium, the survival cuto¤ rises, while the export participation cuto¤ x falls. For both incumbent and new exporters, labor demand rises, while for nonexporters labor demand falls. By our assumption on G ( ; ') ; the exporting …rms are more skill intensive on average than the non-exporting …rms, so the expansion of the former and the contraction of the latter means a shift up in the relative demand for skill, equation (36) . To satisfy the relative labor market clearing condition (41), the skill premium must rise. We thus have Proposition 1. For trade between identical countries with skill-biased heterogeneous …rms, a fall in leads to an increase in the skill premium in both countries.
Proof: To be completed.
The e¤ects on the sets of surviving and exporting …rms are illustrated in Figure 2 . The result that trade liberalization may raise the skill premium appears in other models, as noted in our introduction. What is new in our model is the integration of relative labor demand e¤ects with …rm heterogeneity. Our model predicts that exporters are both more skill-intensive and more productive than non-exporters, and it is this interaction that generates the increased skill premium with trade liberalization.
There are aggregate gains to trade and trade liberalization in our model, but the factor price e¤ects leave open the possibility that unskilled workers may see real wage losses from trade liberalization. We investigate this issue in our numerical analysis below.
Equilibrium with factor endowment di¤erences
In this section we extend our model to consider trade between countries that di¤er in their relative factor endowments. We continue to assume that countries have the same cost functions and ex ante technology distributions G ( ; '). This is an interesting and relevant case, and the basic logic of the model is very similar to the identical country case. However the need to keep track of two countries (who we denote by A and B superscripts) complicates the notation considerably. Where possible we closely follow , who develop an elegant approach to analyzing non-identical countries in a Melitz-style model.
Firm behavior and the entry and export cuto¤ s
Domestic revenue for a …rm in country c depends only on the macro variables R c (P c ) 1 and inverse marginal cost,
Variable pro…ts from domestic sales are a fraction 1 of revenues, from which we subtract …xed costs to get total pro…ts in the domestic market, which de…nes the zero pro…t cuto¤ level of inverse marginal cost,
Export revenue may di¤er from domestic market revenue for two reasons: transport costs and di¤erences in R c (P c ) 1 : Relative revenue in the home and export markets for …rms located in the two countries are
where r c x is export revenue for a …rm located in c. The variable c is the relative size of c's export market compared to c's domestic market. This then de…nes the incremental pro…ts from exporting and the export productivity cuto¤,
By relating the levels of domestic revenue at c and c x ; we can link the export cuto¤s to the domestic cuto¤s. A bit of algebra establishes
It is instructive to compare these expressions to equation (18) . Unlike in the identical country case, the endogenous variables R c and P c enter the relationship between c and c x ; so we can not assure c < c x simply by a choice of parameters. Nonetheless, since exporters are generally found to be larger and more productive than non-exporters in the data, we will focus exclusively on equilibria where c > 1: The cuto¤s de…ne regions of active and exporting …rms as in equations (19) and (20), with c superscripts as appropriate. The same is true for the de…nitions of entry and export probabilities given by (10) and (11).
Free entry
The free entry condition in each country is virtually the same as in the identical country case. With appropriate c superscripts, the inverse unit cost averages (23) and (24), and the free entry conditions are given by (27) . A complication relative to the identical country case is that the the aggregates R c and P c enter the free entry conditions, through equations (53) and (54).
Labor market equilibrium
In our development of the relative labor market clearing condition (41) in the identical country case, it was convenient that the aggregates R c and P c cancelled out when forming (41). This is no longer the case because of asymmetries in market sizes. In most instances the correct expressions can be obtained by replacing The signi…cance of this is that it is no longer possible to solve for factor prices separately from the aggregates R c and P c : Thus there is no relative labor market equilibrium condition corresponding to (41). The treatment of labor used in …xed costs is unchanged, except that we introduce a technological di¤erence across countries by letting the parameter c = H c L c be country speci…c. As in the identical country model, the purpose of this assumption is to neutralize any e¤ects of entry on aggregate relative factor demand.
Aggregation and equilibrium
The determination of R and M follow equations (42) and (44). For the price index, we account for di¤erences in average productivities~ c and~ c x , the mass of …rms M c , and the conditional probability of exporting c across countries,
This completes the description of the model with non-identical countries. Although the underlying economics of the model is unchanged, solution is much more challenging when countries are not identical because all the endogenous variables in both countries need to be solved simultaneously. The economics behind this complexity is that each country's per-…rm demand shifter R c (P c ) 1 enters the other country's productivity cuto¤s (see equations (53) and (54)). We take one factor price as our numeraire, which leaves three factor prices, four productivity cuto¤s, and six aggregates R c ; M c , and P c to be solved together. These thirteen variables are determined by three factor market clearing conditions (equations (34) and (35) for each country, with one equation discarded as redundant), the four zero cuto¤ productivity conditions ((equation (48) for each country plus (53) and (54)), and the six equations de…ne the aggregates R c ; M c , and P c (equations (42) and (44) for each country plus (55) and (56)).
Trade liberalization and the skill premium
What e¤ects do trade liberalization have in the asymmetric country version of our model? Full analysis can only be done numerically, but some insight can be gained through analytical reasoning. In all of what follows, we assume that country A ("North") is more skill abundant than country B ("South").
Consider the two countries in autarky. If skilled labor is su¢ ciently scarce, the skill premium will be positive in both countries, and higher in B,
We consider two cases: productivity ' and are uncorrelated, which we call the "no bias" case, and ' and are strongly positively correlated (so that unit costs and skill intensity are negatively correlated), the "skill biased" case.
no skill bias in technology In the no bias case, in autarky there is a negative relationship between unit costs and factor intensity, with more skill intensive …rms having higher unit costs. In short, having a high skill share is bad news for a …rm: it means they have higher labor costs without, on average, any associated technological advantage. This relationship is stronger in B than in A, by equation (57). As a consequence, skill-intensive goods are cheaper on average in A than in B in autarky.
Now consider an opening to costly trade. Holding factor costs …xed, this will lead to an expansion of the lower-cost …rms in both countries, and contraction or exit for higher cost …rms. Because the low-cost …rms are less skill intensive, this will lead to an increased relative demand for unskilled workers in both countries, with the e¤ect stronger in B than in A. To restore factor market equilibrium, the skill premium must fall in both countries, with a steeper decline in B than in A. So we have Proposition 2. If productivity ' and are uncorrelated, and autarky skill premia satisfy (57), then opening to costly trade leads to a fall in the skill premium in both countries, with a steeper fall in the skill-scarce country than in the skill-abundant country. Relative factor prices converge across countries, although they are not equalized.
"Proof": Demonstrated numerically, available on request.
We are emphatically no longer in a Heckscher-Ohlin world. By Proposition 2, opening to trade raises the skill premium in skill-abundant A relative to skill-scarce B, but the skill premium falls in both countries. By contrast, prove a Stolper-Samuelson like result in their model, where trade liberalization raises the skill premium in the North and reduces it in the South. The reason for the di¤erence is quite simple: in our model there is no connection between factor intensity and preferences. As a result, an increase in import competition in our model a¤ects demand for all domestically produced goods symmetrically. In models with a Heckscher-Ohlin structure (including ), by contrast, an increase in import competition changes the relative demand for domestically produced goods. Because relative goods demand is directly linked to a relative factor demands, Stolper-Samuelson type results follow. In our model the factor price e¤ects of opening to trade have nothing to do with demand and everything to do with supply: since skill-intensive …rms have higher costs, opening to trade reduces the relative demand for skilled workers, with the e¤ect stronger where skilled workers are initially more expensive.
skill biased technology We now turn to the empirically relevant case, where skill intensity is associated with higher factor costs but also better technology on average. We focus on the case where the technology e¤ect is dominant, so that on average more skill intensive …rms have lower unit costs. In autarky the negative relationship between skill intensity and unit costs will be stronger in A than in B, by equation (57). Now consider an opening to costly trade. Holding factor costs …xed, this will lead to an expansion of the lower-cost …rms in both countries, and contraction or exit for higher cost …rms. This will lead to an increase in the relative demand for skill in both countries, with a stronger e¤ect in A than in B. To restore factor market equilibrium, the skill premium must rise in both countries, with a larger increase in A than in B. So we have Proposition 3. If productivity ' and are strongly positively correlated, and autarky skill premia satisfy (57), then opening to costly trade leads to a rise in the skill premium in both countries, with a stronger increase in the skill-abundant country than in the skill-scarce country. Relative factor prices converge across countries.
This result is similar to what we showed for identical countries in Proposition 1.
trade patterns Although the factor price e¤ects of opening to trade in our model are very di¤erent from what is found in Heckscher-Ohlin models, the trade patterns are broadly in line with Heckscher-Ohlin predictions, although the mechanism is di¤erent. Because the skill premium remains lower in A than in B after liberalization, A will have a comparative advantage in high skilled goods, and production in each country will shift toward comparative advantage goods. In our model, what we mean by comparative advantage is that high-skill exporters are more likely to come from A, while low-skill exporters are more likely to come from B. The specialization pattern is illustrated in Figure 3 , which is drawn on the assumption that the overall level of competition is less intense in B than in A (this is not essential, but it is what we …nd in our numerical analysis below).
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we add structure to the theory model of the previous section. This structure has two elements: assumptions about functional forms, and choices of key parameters. We use the Chilean data to calibrate our identical country model. We then investigate the e¤ects of trade liberalization, with a focus on the e¤ects on the skill premium.
Data
Our numerical results hinge on our choice of the parameters that govern the joint distribution of skilled labor share and productivity. In order to discipline our choice of parameters, we turn to the Annual National Industrial Survey of Chile (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual, or ENIA). The ENIA is conducted annually by the Chilean government statistical o¢ ce (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, or INE). The ENIA covers the universe of Chilean manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers. (Pavcnik 2002) indicates that in 1979-1986 more than 90% of Chilean manufacturing …rms had only one plant -so the distinction between plants and …rms is unlikely to be very important. We use only one year, 1996, in which 5,466 plants are surveyed 5 . Our concept of a skilled worker is captured in the ENIA by white collar workers. For each of these plants we construct the following variables: log revenue white collar employment share white collar wage bill share export status (ex=1 if export revenue>0).
We eliminated 771 observations (13.5% of the total) that had either white collar employment share or white collar wage bill share equal to 0 or 1 (these coincide 95% of the times). These plants account for 15.5% of total revenue in the sample and are slightly larger, but their distribution of revenues is not dissimilar from the rest, so that this elimination does not a¤ect much the overall distribution of revenues. However, only 7% of these plants export, compared to 23.8% of the other plants.
Thus, we use a cross section of 4695 pants in 1996, of which 23.8% are exporters. Key features of the data are described in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 4 and 5. Table 1 shows that exporters are indeed larger. The distribution of log revenues for exporters is less skewed to the right, i.e. the largest exporters are closer to their respective mean than the largest …rms that do not export. Exporters also employ a larger share of skilled labor and pay them a larger share of the wage bill. As with log revenues, we see that the distribution of these shares for exporters is less skewed to the right. Figure 4 shows the distributions for the white-collar wage bill share ("skill share" for short) for exporters and non-exporters. The most interesting aspect of Figure 4 is not the di¤erence in median skill shares (which is well known) but the variability: many exporters have low skill shares, and conversely for non-exporters. In fact, 8 percent of exporters have lower skill shares than the median non-exporter, while 19 percent of non-exporters have higher skill shares than the median exporter. Table 2 shows that the correlation between log revenues and the skill share is positive, and slightly more so for exporters. We exploit these di¤erences when choosing parameter values for the joint distribution of skilled labor share and productivity in the model.
Figures 5a and 5b are an illustration from the Chilean data of the phenomenon illustrated theoretically in Figure 1 : exporters are on average more skill-intensive and larger, but there is great heterogeneity in both size and skill intensity.
Modelling the correlation between skill intensity and productivity
A key innovation in our model is that we allow for positive but imperfect correlation between skill intensity and productivity ': To implement this we …rst specify the marginal distributions of and ', and then model the correlation between them It is standard to model variation in productivity with a Pareto distribution, and we follow this practice here. Since the skill share lies in the unit interval, we model it as following a Beta distribution. These densities are respectively
To ‡exibly allow correlation between ' and while maintaining their marginal distributions, we apply the theory of copulas from mathematical statistics (the standard reference is (Nelsen 2006) ).
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The theory of copulas was …rst used in international trade theory by (Davis and Harrigan 2007) , also to accommodate two dimensions of heterogeneity in a Melitz-type model. Letting the marginal distribution functions for and ' be G ( ) and G ' (') respectively, our parameterization of G ( ; ') uses the Plackett copula,
where the parameter > 0; 6 = 1 governs the correlation between ' and : For = 1; ' and are independent, and G ( ; ') = G G ' : The correlation between the values of the marginal distribution functions G ( ) and G ' (') is
This correlation has range ( 1; 1) and is monotonically increasing in ; with negative correlation when < 1 and positive correlation when > 1: There is no expression available for the correlation between ' and : In our simulations, we use = 8, which gives Corr( ; ') = 0:43.
Calibration
We use a minimum distance estimator to estimate four distributional parameters:
k -the Pareto shape coe¢ cient in (58).
a; b -two parameters of the beta distribution in (59).
-the Plackett copula association parameter in (60). 6 For the Pareto distribution, we normalize the lower bound to one. For the Beta distribution,
; where (:) is the gamma function. 7 In the simplest case, a copula is a function that binds two marginal distribution functions to create a joint distribution function, with the degree of association between the marginal distributions governed by the parameter of the copula.
We hold constant all other parameters of the model. The estimation proceeds as follows. Given a guess of parameter values we simulate the model for the symmetric open economy case with a relatively low level of trade costs ( = 1.1) and calculate a vector of moments, (k; a; b; ). We choose (k; a; b; ) to minimize
where are corresponding moments from the Chilean plant data and W is a weighting matrix. Since we do not have a priori information about which moment is more important, we use W = I, the identity matrix. 8 We use 9 moments to estimate these parameters. The model moments are calculated by simulation. 9 We choose the following moments (which can be found in Tables 1 and  2): Overall correlation between log revenues and white collar wage bill share. This moment identi…es .
The di¤erence between average log revenues for exporters versus non exporters.
Proportion of exporters = 23.8%. Together with the previous one, this moment identi…es k. (Even though we have a functional relationship between ' and ' x , it does not determine the percent of exporters, which is in ‡uenced by how fat the right tail of the Pareto distribution is).
The mean, standard deviation and skewness for white collar wage bill share, separately for exporters and non exporters (6 moments). These moments identify a and b, but also help to identify , as described below.
The results are, roughly, k = 3.5, = 8, a = 2, b = 4.
10 This is what we use throughout all numerical exercises. Using the correlations between log revenues and white collar wage bill share separately for exporters and non exporters hardly changes the estimates. One remarkable result is that simulation of the model using the estimates yields distributions of log revenue and the wage bill share that match the shape of the empirical distributions very closely, in particular those in Figure 3 . Although …rms with a high skilled workers wage bill share have higher costs (given a positive skill premium), we see relatively more such exporters versus non exporters. The estimation captures this feature, because it assigns a positive correlation with productivity ( = 8).
The other parameters of our model are elasticity of substitution = 3 entry …xed cost f e = 15
per-period …xed cost f = 1
per-period …xed export cost f x = 1:6
per-period death probability = 0:05 8 More details can be found in (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) . 9 Using simulation to calculate these moments introduces some additional error, in addition to sampling error. This error vanishes with the number of draws used to compute the moments. We use 500,000 draws, so this type of error is likely to be very small. See (Stern 1997 ) for a clear exposition of simulation based estimation.
1 0 a = 2, b = 4 implies that the mean of the marginal distrubution for is The rationale for choosing these values varies. The most critical choice is = 3; a fairly small value which is chosen because we require k > 1: Thus requirement is standard in Melitz-style models (including ) where productivity has a Pareto distribution, and ensures a …nite variance of log productivity. The …xed costs are chosen to generate a realistic share of exporters, who have lower unit costs than non-exporters.
Equilibrium with identical countries
In this section we simulate the identical country version of our model, using the parameters described above. Both countries have relative skill endowments of H L = 0.5, and the exercise lowers variable trade costs from = 2 to = 1.1. Results are illustrated in Figure 5 .
The purely Melitz side of the model is illustrated in the four panels of Figure 6a . Trade liberalization leads to heightened competition, which is manifested in higher survival cost cuto¤s and lower export cost cuto¤s. The result is less equilibrium entry, and the mass of …rms is smaller. Unlike in (Melitz 2003) , the weighted average productivity of active …rms is not a useful summary statistic, since it is unit cost, rather than productivity per se, that determines success in our model. Instead, we focus on real GDP (de…ned as GDP in terms of the numeraire divided by the aggregate price index) as a summary of the economy-wide e¤ects of trade liberalization. As expected real GDP rises substantially as trade barriers are reduced.
The novelty in our model comes from the factor market consequences of trade liberalization, which are illustrated in the three panels of Figure 6b . The skill premium rises substantially as trade barriers fall, from 1.41 to 1.55. Real skilled wages rise faster, as the aggregate price index declines. As a consequence, unskilled workers (whose wage is the numeraire) also see modest real wage increases. The reason for this is the improvement in aggregate e¢ ciency caused by trade liberalization, with high-cost low-skill …rms exiting or contracting and low-cost, high-skill …rms entering the export market.
Equilibrium with factor endowment di¤erences
Next we turn to trade liberalization between countries that di¤er in their factor endowments. The relative factor endowments are but otherwise the two countries are identical, most importantly in their ex ante skillproductivity distributions G ( ; '). As in the previous exercise, we lower variable trade costs from = 2 to = 1.1. The numeraire is the unskilled wage in country B. Results are illustrated in Figure 7 and 8.
The four panels of Figure 7a illustrate the expected Melitz-type mechanisms: as trade is liberalized, entry becomes more di¢ cult, the mass of …rms falls, and the share of exporters gets monotonically higher. Aggregate gains from trade are shown by rising real GDP in both countries. Since country B is poorer (by virtue of is relative abundance of unskilled labor) and thus economically smaller, it is a less competitive market at all levels of ; with easier entry and a larger mass of …rms.
The four panels of Figure 7b are more striking. Trade liberalization initially raises the skill premium in both countries, though faster in A than in B. Because of the very strong price level e¤ects of liberalization, all workers in both countries see their real wages increase.
As trade liberalization proceeds, however, the skill premium in B eventually falls even as the skill premium in A continues to rise. The reason for the turnaround in the skill premium in B is entry of new exporters, who are eventually less skill intensive than the economy-wide average. This extensive margin e¤ect is also present in A, but the relative labor demand impact is less strong in A due to the lower skill premium in A. Put di¤erently, entering exporters are less skill intensive in B than in A. Furthermore, because of less stringent survival cuto¤s in B than in A, there are more low-productivity, low-skill …rms that survive in B, which also tends to depress the skill premium.
None of this has anything to do with Stolper-Samuelson type forces, which are completely absent in our model.. The Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect works through shifts in product demand: for example, increased import competition from the South lowers the relative demand for labor-intensive goods in the North, with resultant e¤ects on wages. But in our model increased import competition from B has no e¤ect on relative product demands in A, since the elasticity of substitution across all goods is the same. In other words, increased import competition from B reduces domestic demand for all varieties proportionally. The factor market consequences come entirely through changes in the set of active …rms, in particular the set of exporters. Figure 8 illustrates the changes in production patterns as trade costs fall from = 2 to = 1.1. The horizontal axis is a …rm's skill share, divided into percentiles, and the vertical axis is the share of national income accounted for by …rms at each percentile of the skill distribution. When trade costs are high, the di¤erence in relative factor prices across countries leads A to have a production structure tilted toward highskill goods, with the opposite true for B. When trade is liberalized, the logic of comparative advantage leads to greater specialization, and the production structures in both countries become more extreme.This intensi…cation of specialization is what contributes to the eventual fall in the skill premium in B that was illustrated in Figure  7b .
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a new explanation for why trade liberalization can be associated with a rising skill premium in both rich and poor countries. Our model has two dimensions in which …rms di¤er, skill intensity and productivity, and our assumption that these two attributes are positively correlated is veri…ed and calibrated using Chilean …rm-level data. Because of this correlation, opening to trade shifts up the relative demand for skilled workers, as low-cost, skill-intensive …rms expand to seize new export opportunities and high-cost, low-skill …rms contract or exit in the face of greater import competition. In equilibrium, the skill premium rises when trade is liberalized between identical countries, though our numerical results show that even unskilled workers gain from trade due to a falling price level.
When countries di¤er in their relative factor endowments, opening to trade leads to relative factor price convergence, as the skill premium rises faster in the skill-abundant country than in the skill-scarce country. As illustrated in our numerical analysis, eventually the skill premium may fall in the skill-scarce country due to entry of low-skill exporters. This result has nothing to do with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, since the mechanism of that famous result is entirely absent in our model. The reason is that our model makes a simple and intuitive departure from one of the key assumptions in the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition: we assume that the elasticity of substitution in demand is common across goods, rather than being higher for goods with the same factor intensity. Although our model has a Heckscher-Ohlin ‡avor in its focus on the interaction between goods with di¤erent factor intensities and countries with di¤erent factor endowments, this seemingly small change in assumptions means that the model works quite di¤erently than models in the Heckscher-Ohlin tradition. We live in an era of rising globalization and rising wage inequality. Our theory suggests that these phenomena are related because trade liberalization raises the relative demand for skilled workers in all countries. In our model, firms are heterogeneous in their productivity, and only the lowest-cost firms participate in the global economy exactly along the lines of <cite>melitz2003impact</cite>. In addition to differing in their productivity, firms in our model differ in their skill intensity. We model skill-biased technology as a correlation between skill intensity and technological acumen, and we estimate this correlation to be large using firm-level data from Chile in 1996. Skillbiased technological heterogeneity implies that, on average, the most competitive firms are also the most skill-intensive. As a consequence, a fall in trade costs leads to both greater trade volumes and an increase in the relative demand for skill, as the lowestcost/most-skilled firms expand to serve the export market while less skill-intensive nonexporters retrench in the face of increased import competition. Thus, trade liberalization leads directly to both greater trade volumes and an increase in the demand for skill. This mechanism works regardless of factor endowment differences. Thus we provide an explanation for why globalization and wage inequality move together in both skillabundant and skill-scarce countries. 
